Palestinian Public Support for Hamas and October 7: Polling Data and Documentation

The question of how much of Gaza's and the West Bank's civilian population supports Hamas and supports the October 7 massacre is politically charged. It is also empirically answerable — there is substantial polling data, including from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), which is the most credible independent Palestinian polling organization and is not aligned with Israel.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a poll in late November 2023 — six weeks after the October 7 massacre — asking Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza directly about the attack.

Results (PCPSR Poll No. 90, December 2023):

• 72% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza combined said they supported Hamas's decision to launch the October 7 attack

• Support was higher in the West Bank (82%) than in Gaza (57%) — the West Bank being the population not directly experiencing the military consequences

• Hamas's approval rating increased dramatically in the West Bank after October 7 — from approximately 12% to 44%

• Support for a two-state solution among Palestinians dropped after October 7

Later PCPSR polls showed support declining, especially in Gaza: in September 2024, 57% of Gazans said the decision was "incorrect" while 64% in the West Bank still called it "correct"; overall support was about 50% by May 2025. PCPSR also found that large majorities said they had not seen videos of atrocities committed by Hamas.

These are not Israeli figures or Western assessments. They are Palestinian polling data from the most credible Palestinian survey organization, asking Palestinians directly.

In January 2006, Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza voted in Palestinian Legislative Council elections that were monitored by international observers — including an EU Election Observation Mission that certified the election as free and fair.

Hamas won decisively: 74 of 132 seats (56%) versus Fatah's 45 seats. Hamas received approximately 44% of the popular vote to Fatah's 41% — a near-majority for a party whose 1988 charter called for Israel's destruction and quoted a hadith about killing Jews.

The international community, including the United States and the European Union, had pressed for the elections as part of the democratization process. When Hamas won, the international community refused to recognize the result and cut aid. Hamas subsequently seized full control of Gaza by force in 2007.

The 2006 election remains the most recent democratic expression of Palestinian political will. It gave Hamas a parliamentary majority for the first time.

PCPSR polls from 2018–2023 consistently showed:

• Majorities in both Gaza and the West Bank consistently said they preferred "armed resistance" over negotiation as the primary strategy
• Support for the Oslo Accords and a two-state solution had declined significantly from its 1990s peak
• Majorities in both territories expressed support for suicide bombings against Israeli civilians in various iterations of this question over the decade

Arab Barometer surveys (an independent academic polling consortium covering the Arab world) produced similar findings.

The October 7 massacre was publicly celebrated in Gaza on the day itself. Footage from that day shows:

• Crowds in Gaza City receiving returning Hamas fighters with celebration
• Bodies of Israeli victims — including civilians and young women — paraded through Gaza streets to public crowds
• Videos distributed on Palestinian social media showing celebrations across Gaza and in parts of the West Bank

These videos were filmed and distributed by participants, not by adversarial media. They are part of the evidentiary record.

Celebrations also occurred in parts of the West Bank, documented on social media, and in Palestinian diaspora communities in some European cities.

The standard Western media framing distinguishes sharply between "Hamas" and "the Palestinian people" — treating Hamas as a governing structure that has been imposed on a population that would prefer peace. The polling data complicates this framing significantly:

• Palestinians democratically elected Hamas in 2006 with a majority
• Majorities in both territories expressed support for the October 7 attack weeks after it occurred
• Hamas's approval rating in the West Bank increased after October 7

None of this means every Palestinian supports Hamas. It does not mean Palestinian civilians deserve to suffer. The distinction between Hamas's fighters and Palestinian civilians is real and important in the laws of armed conflict.

But it does mean that the framing of this as "Hamas vs. the Palestinian people" — with Hamas as an occupying force over a population that would choose peace if only it could — is not supported by the available polling evidence. A more accurate framing is that Hamas has significant and documented popular support, that support for October 7 was majority-level shortly after the attack, and that any realistic path to peace must reckon with those political realities rather than paper over them.